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Abstract
Investor sophistication has lagged behind the growing complexity of
retail financial markets. To explore this, we develop a dynamic model
to study the interaction between obfuscation and investor sophistica-
tion in mutual fund markets. Taking into account different learning
mechanisms within the investor population, we characterize the op-
timal timing of obfuscation for financial institutions who offer retail
products. We show that educational initiatives that are directed to fa-
cilitate learning by investors may induce providers to increase wasteful
obfuscation, further disorienting investors and decreasing overall wel-
fare. Obfuscation decreases with competition among firms, since the
information rents from obfuscation dissipate as each institution attracts
a smaller market share.
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1 Introduction
The menu of offerings for retail financial products has grown steadily over the last twenty years,
and the shear number of choices is now daunting. For example, as of 2007, there were 8,029
mutual funds to choose from and 21,631 different share classes (Investment Company Institute
2008). While such proliferation may add value in completing markets, it may also adversely affect
investor sophistication.1 Newcomers in the market have more to learn when they make their initial
allocations, and incumbent participants bear a higher burden to keep up with developments in the
investment market. Moreover, it remains unclear whether having access to more options leads to
better decisions, as participants often make suboptimal choices in the face of too much information
(e.g. Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang, 2004; Salgado, 2006; Iyengar and Kamenica, 2008).
The interaction between the number/attributes of mutual fund offerings and the evolution of
investor sophistication, therefore, introduces an externality that new funds and changing product
offerings slow learning and may preserve industry rents for providers of financial services. Using
this practice strategically has been termed obfuscation by Ellison and Ellison (2008).2 Indeed,
many new funds do not depart much from old ones, and are redundant even within specific fund
families. There are straightforward strategic considerations at play: as Christoffersen and Musto
(2002) point out, financial institutions often offer several classes of investment products to price
discriminate among investors of varied levels of sophistication. As they document in the money
fund industry, discrimination through such purposeful distortions in transparency is an important
source of value to providers.
The purpose of this paper, then, is to explore the dynamic relationship between obfuscation and
sophistication in retail financial markets, taking into account that learning mechanisms within the
investor population play an important role. We specifically address the following questions: How
often do providers of financial services optimally practice obfuscation, given that investors learn over
time? How do specific learning processes (e.g. learning from others, learning from periodicals) affect
these dynamics? What effect do competition and participation have on obfuscation? How does
obfuscation affect portfolio allocation decisions? What are the policy implications for educational
initiatives and regulation in financial markets?
To address these questions, we begin by analyzing a retail market in continuous time in which a
1Many participants in the market have limited sophistication regarding the products in the market (e.g. NASD
Literacy Survey 2003). See also Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince 1996; Alexander, Jones, and Nigro 1998; Barber,
Odean, and Zheng 2005; Agnew and Szykman 2005.
2For static theoretical models of obfuscation, see Spiegler (2006), Carlin (2009), and Ellison and Wolitzky (2010).
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provider who is a monopolist markets a family of mutual funds to a heterogeneous group of investors.
Investors are either experts, in which case they always choose the optimal fund within the offering,
or they are non-experts, in which case their sophistication waxes and wanes based on learning
mechanisms and changes in the fund family. When non-experts are informed (i.e., sophisticated),
either through access to experts or public signals, they pick the optimal fund. However, when
they are uninformed, they may either pay excessive fees or not get the best quality. As such, the
provider earns higher rents from investors who are unsophisticated.
Sophistication evolves according to a general learning process, which is a differential equation
with commonly known initial conditions. When the provider changes his mutual funds, the popu-
lation is “refreshed” so that sophistication returns to its initial level and learning begins again. In
essence, then, there are three groups of investors in the market: experts who are always sophisti-
cated, non-experts who become sophisticated transiently, and non-experts who remain unsophis-
ticated. Controlling the balance of sophisticated and unsophisticated non-experts is at the heart
of the provider’s problem. As such, the provider maximizes profits by deciding how frequently to
alter his mutual fund offerings, affecting the learning process.
The problem that the provider faces is stationary and therefore, in equilibrium there exists a
unique optimal time to change the fund offerings. The optimal time is strictly decreasing in the
extra rents gained from unsophisticated investors and strictly increasing in the cost incurred in
doing so. The intuition is that the more the provider gains from unsophisticated investors, the
higher is the benefit from refreshing the population and keeping non-expert investors in the dark.
On the other hand, the more costly it is for the provider to do this, the lower is the benefit from
refreshing the population. These comparative statics have straightforward cross-sectional empirical
implications. For example, our analysis predicts that we should observe more product changes and
redundancy among classes of mutual funds with higher price dispersion.3 To our knowledge, this
prediction is novel and has yet to be tested.4
The relationship between the frequency of obfuscation and the speed at which non-experts
become sophisticated is non-monotonic, however. The intuition is as follows. If non-experts learn
very quickly, then the gains to refreshing the population are short-lived. Given that there is a fixed
cost of changing the funds, it may not be worthwhile to change them as frequently. Moreover,
3As Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) note, the amount of price dispersion varies among different classes of funds,
which likely indicates a difference in the sophistication (i.e. search costs) among consumers within each asset class.
See Table 1 in Hortacsu and Syverson (2004).
4Testing this prediction might involve correlating price dispersion within groups of homogeneous offerings with
number of share classes offered, either cross-sectionally or in a time-series.
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when non-experts are very slow to learn and the extra rents gained from unsophistication are long-
lived, the provider will optimally choose to refresh the population less frequently, again because
there is a cost to doing so. This phenomenon has welfare implications for educational initiatives
that the government may undertake. If the population learns relatively slowly, improving the
learning process marginally will actually decrease welfare, as it increases the frequency of wasteful
obfuscation.5 Small educational initiatives that increase the speed of learning are only likely to
increase welfare when non-experts already learn sufficiently fast.
The type of learning that takes place in the market also affects obfuscation and the policies that
are set. Based on the information percolation model of Duffie and Manso (2007), we analyze two
specific settings: one in which investors learn by themselves (e.g. by reading periodicals) and one
in which they learn from each other. In the former setting, as the initial set of experts rises, the
frequency of obfuscation by the provider decreases. This occurs because there is less to gain from
refreshing the population. Educational initiatives that improve the level of expertise in the market
are always welfare enhancing in this case because increasing expertise lowers obfuscation. When
investors learn from each other, however, we obtain different results. The comparative statics
and policy considerations are very similar to the effect of learning speed. This non-monotonic
relationship can be appreciated as follows. When no one is an expert initially, there is no one to
learn from, and therefore the provider never changes their mutual fund offerings. When everyone
is an expert initially, then there is no gain to refreshing the population. Therefore, obfuscation
only takes place when a fraction of the population has expertise and there is a non-monotonic
relationship between expertise and the frequency of obfuscation.
We extend our analysis to consider other welfare effects of obfuscation. Indeed, in the base
model, the only cost to society is the cost that the provider incurs when he refreshes. There
are many other potential costs to society such as non-participation, the cost of learning, and the
misallocation of resources. We extend the model to consider these other sources of welfare loss.
First, we show that participation increases obfuscation, which might give policy makers pause
before encouraging people to increase their investments in mutual funds. Second, we quantify how
obfuscation causes distortions in investors’ portfolio allocations. Third, we quantify the opportunity
cost of becoming an expert in the first place: we analyze how expertise arises endogenously in the
market, given that the provider has an incentive to obfuscate and maximize profits.
5Policies designed to assist investors have the adverse effect to induce the provider to refresh more frequently. This
causes non-expert investors to fall further behind, making the task of keeping up more costly. Absent such marginal
initiatives, the provider would also save on the costs of wasteful innovation.
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Finally, we consider the effect of competition on obfuscation. We show that increased compe-
tition should slow obfuscation. The reason for this is that there is less to gain for each provider
when they refresh the population. In essence, the information rents that financial institutions gain
by refreshing dissipate with more competition. This improves welfare as the side effects from ob-
fuscation decrease: fewer investors pay the opportunity cost of becoming an expert, more investors
participate, and the misallocation of resources decreases.
The focus of this paper is on mutual fund allocation and investment. Yet, our analysis applies to
other financial decisions: credit card financing, life annuities, mortgages, life insurance, education
savings plans. The disparity between sophistication and complexity in these other markets is also
striking. This not only degrades personal welfare, but also affects the economy as a whole. Indeed,
participation without sophistication is frequently cited as a root cause of the recent financial crisis:
many home owners did not appreciate the variable-rate clauses in their mortgages and their explicit
exposure to interest rate risk. At the same time, failure of many home owners to appreciate the
fees and interest rate schedules used commonly in credit cards has led to a record-setting amount
of household debt and a growing number of personal defaults in the U.S.
What to do about the disparity between sophistication and complexity has recently received
much attention, though the optimal solution remains hotly debated. While Lusardi and Mitchell
(2007) argue that education improves investor welfare, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2008) show that
investors appear to ignore fees when making decisions, even when they are given salient information
about the importance of taking fees into consideration. In lieu of a large-scale educational effort,
there is now growing support for the use of default options to assist retail investors and improve
welfare (e.g., Choi, Madrian, Laibson, and Metrick 2004). Our analysis adds to this debate: while
not specifically modeled in our paper, default options would in essence make more investors experts
(by proxy) and may decrease obfuscation, especially when used on a grand scale or in markets in
which people learn on their own. Libertarian paternalism, as posed by Thaler and Sunstein (2003),
makes sense in our model: a large scale increase in the fraction of experts would slow obfuscation
and encourage participation. Investigating this debate further is the subject of future research
(Carlin, Gervais, and Manso, 2010).
Finally, our paper may be readily applied in consumer markets, especially those in which ser-
vice is a key component and there is a large discrepancy between sophistication and complexity
(e.g., health care). As such, our contribution is also of general economic interest as it adds a new
and important dimension to an already extensive literature on oligopoly competition with con-
sumer search (e.g. Diamond, 1971; Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989; Gabaix
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and Laibson, 2006). Indeed, in many existing theoretical models, consumers search for the best
alternative, but the firms are unable to affect the search environment except through the prices
they choose. Few notable exceptions are papers by Robert and Stahl (1993), Carlin (2009), and
Ellison and Wolitzky (2010). Robert and Stahl (1993) analyze a model of sequential search in which
firms may advertise to consumers in the population. Carlin (2009) and Ellison and Wolitzky (2010)
analyze a static model in which firms simultaneously choose whether to add complexity to their
pricing schedules. Our analysis departs from the above papers in several ways. First, our model is
fully dynamic so that we can characterize how obfuscation evolves over time. Second, our model
is general in that it can account for innovation in both prices and product characteristics. Finally,
in our analysis we are able to characterize how different types of learning affects both obfuscation
and the policies that govern these markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we pose a dynamic model of
obfuscation and investor sophistication, given that the provider in the market is a monopolist. In
Section 3, we characterize optimal obfuscation by the provider, and evaluate the effect that different
learning models have on welfare and policy considerations. In Section 4, we consider participation
in the market and how obfuscation affects portfolio allocation by non-experts. In Section 5, we
analyze how expertise arises endogenously. In Section 6, we consider the effect that competition
has on obfuscation. Section 7 concludes. All of the proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a financial institution (i.e., a provider) that markets a family of heterogeneous mutual
funds to a unit mass of household investors over an infinite horizon. Time evolves continuously and
future cash flows are discounted at an interest rate r. The funds that are offered may differ along
several dimensions (e.g., fees, target benchmarks, turnover, or alphas), but at any particular time
one of the funds is clearly superior to the others. For example, within a group of money funds, one
of them has lower fees than the others. We begin by considering that the provider is a monopolist,
but extend the analysis to competitive markets in Section 6.
Each investor i ∈ I in the market has unit demand for a mutual fund. Based on the information
that they have, each investor chooses within the fund offerings to maximize their expected payoff.
At t = 0, investors are divided into two groups: experts x0 and non-experts y0 = 1− x0. Experts
costlessly acquire information about all of the funds offered, and are able to quickly adapt to
changes in the market and the fund family. Experts always make the best choice. In contrast,
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non-experts are less discriminating. When they are uninformed, they choose one fund from the
product offering randomly.6 When they become informed transiently through learning, they mimic
the experts and choose the optimal fund. This knowledge is fragile, however, as non-experts are
unable to keep up with changes that occur in the market or fund family. As such, the sophistication
level of non-experts may wax and wane, whereas experts are always sophisticated. For now, we
take the values of x0 and y0 as given exogenously, but we consider their endogenous determination
in Section 5.
As time evolves, non-experts may learn either through interaction with experts or through
access to public signals (e.g., reading periodicals). Therefore, at any time t, the fraction of sophis-
ticated investors xt is composed of the initial fraction of experts plus non-experts who have become
informed through interaction. The remaining population yt is the group of non-experts who remain
unsophisticated.
Learning takes place as follows. Without obfuscation (to be specified shortly), the fraction xt
of sophisticated investors evolves according to the differential equation
dxt = f(λ, xt)dt, (1)
with initial values x0 and y0. At each instant in time, the rate at which investors become informed
is a function of the fraction xt of informed investors in the population and λ, which measures the
speed of learning. That is, λ parameterizes how easy it is for investors to access public information
or learn from each other. By construction, dyt = −dxt. We assume that f(λ, xt) is strictly
positive, continuously differentiable, and increasing in λ. Therefore, without a change in the product
offerings, xt increases over time while yt decreases. The evolution equation (1) is flexible enough to
incorporate several important forms of learning. For now, however, we consider a general learning
process and characterize the optimal behavior by the provider. Later, in Section 3.2, we consider
more specific models of learning and contrast the effects that they have on the provider’s behavior
and economic welfare.
The provider earns profits π(xt, yt) from his investors at each instant in time. Because unso-
phisticated investors are less able to choose the most advantageous fund, the rents that the provider
captures are larger for these investors. To capture this mathematically, we consider that at any
6Non-experts are either fully informed or completely uninformed. Therefore, our set-up is a dynamic version of a
standard all-or-nothing search model (e.g. Salop and Stiglitz, 1979; Varian, 1980). Random purchase by non-experts
is typical in this literature, but an all-or-nothing search process is not necessary to derive the results that follow. For
example, using a sequential search model as in Stahl (1989) would generate the same lack of discriminating behavior.
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instant, the provider’s profit is
π(xt, yt) = axt + byt,
where b > a. The profit a represents the rent that is gained from selling a fund to informed
investors, whereas b− a is the added gain from selling to unsophisticated investors.7 For example,
experts always choose the money fund with the lowest fees, whereas non-experts may sometimes
invest in funds with higher costs, and therefore not get the best deal. As sophistication increases
via (1), the added gains to the provider diminish.
The provider may prohibit learning, though, by changing the attributes of the funds in his
offering (i.e. obfuscation). This may involve changing the mix of funds offered or altering the fees
charged. Mathematically, we assume that the provider can at any time t refresh population learning
by returning the fraction of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors to their initial levels x0 and
y0. The provider pays a cost c to do so, and chooses his timing optimally to maximize lifetime
profits. As such, the times in which the provider obfuscates is given by a vector T = (t1, t2, t3, . . .)
with ti ≤ ti+1 for all i. For any t ∈ [ti, ti+1], the dynamics of sophistication evolves according to the
differential equation (1) with xti = x0. The fraction x0 catches on quickly when the provider makes
changes, but the fraction y0 does not: whereas non-experts may become informed for a while, their
sophistication is fragile as they depend on the learning process in (1).
The problem that the provider faces is
sup
T=(t1,t2,t3,...)
s.t. ti≤ti+1
∫ ∞
0
e−rtπ(xt, yt)dt− C(r, T ), (2)
where xt evolves according to the differential equation (1) in the interval [ti, ti+1) with initial
condition xti = x0 for all i. The quantity C(r, T ) sums the discounted lifetime costs of obfuscation
according to the plan T , and is computed as
C(r, T ) =
∞∑
i=1
e−rtic. (3)
We characterize the solution to this problem in the next section.
7In Section 6, when we study competition, the rents obtained from sophisticated and unsophisticated investors
arise endogenously. The assumption that b > a can also be considered a Nash bargaining solution in which the
provider gains a larger fraction of the trade surplus from unsophisticated investors than from sophisticated investors.
In this sense, both experts and non-experts are rationally willing to participate in the market. This assumption is
consistent with the search literature (e.g. Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989) and the literature in which the timing of sales is
used to discriminate between well-informed and ill-informed consumers (Salop, 1977; Conlisk, Gerstner, and Sobel,
1984; Rosenthal, 1982; Sobel, 1984).
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Before doing so, though, it is instructive to consider a practical example of obfuscation, based
on the dynamic fee-setting behavior observed in the money fund industry (Christoffersen and
Musto, 2002). Consider a provider that offers two money funds with different fee structures.
Sophisticated investors choose the one with lower fees, whereas unsophisticated investors pick one
of them randomly. As time progresses and unsophisticated investors learn about the fund with
lower fees, fewer investors demand the fund with higher fees. The provider may then add a third
money fund that has low fees and progressively raise the fees of the “old” low-fee fund. The
result is that expert investors will catch on quickly to this strategy and switch funds, while a new
breed of unsophisticated investors evolves. What our model captures, therefore, is the idea that
investors need to keep up with innovation in prices and quality in order to continue to get the best
deal. Other examples might include different funds that sell for the same price, but have quality
differences (e.g., less turnover or better monitoring of managers) that require different investment
on the part of the provider. Our model as posed is general to consider heterogeneity on multiple
dimensions.
3 Obfuscation and Sophistication
We begin by solving the provider’s obfuscation problem and characterize its solution in generality,
given that learning proceeds according to (1). Then, we consider specific examples of learning
processes and contrast the obfuscation that takes place in each case. Following this, we discuss
several welfare and policy considerations that arise based on the type of learning that takes place
in the market.
3.1 Optimal Obfuscation
The provider’s problem is stationary. That is, after the provider obfuscates, he faces a problem
that is isomorphic to the one he faced at t = 0. The following proposition relies on dynamic
programming techniques to simplify the provider’s problem.
Proposition 1. An optimal T = (t1, t2, t3, . . .) that solves (2) is such ti+1 − ti = ti − ti−1 for any
i. Therefore, the provider’s problem reduces to choosing the duration t∗ of each cycle:
max
t
∫ t
0 e
−rs{axs + b(1− xs)}ds − e
−rtc
1− e−rt
, (4)
where xs evolves according to (1), the learning process without obfuscation.
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According to Proposition 1, we may focus on the solution to the problem in (4) to derive the
optimal plan T ∗ = (t∗, 2t∗, 3t∗, . . . ), which is stationary. As such, the population of sophisticated
investors evolves according to (1) from x0 to xt∗ , until the provider refreshes and the process begins
again. In the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix, we show that such a stationary plan is superior
to any arbitrary control sequence that changes over time (i.e., a non-stationary plan).
The next proposition characterizes the solution to (4).
Proposition 2. (Optimal Obfuscation) There exists a unique optimal stopping time t∗ > 0 that
solves the provider’s problem. If
c < c¯ ≡
∫ ∞
0
e−rs{axs + b(1− xs)}ds − lim
t→∞
{axt + b(1− xt)}
r
, (5)
then the optimal stopping time t∗ is finite and solves
(1− e−rt){axt + b(1− xt)} − r
∫ t
0
e−rs{axs + b(1− xs)}ds + rc = 0. (6)
Otherwise, t∗ =∞. Moreover, for t∗ <∞,
(i) ∂t
∗
∂b
< 0
(ii) ∂t
∗
∂a
> 0
(iii) ∂t
∗
∂c
> 0
According to Proposition 2, obfuscation takes place more frequently when the additional rents
that are gained from unsophisticated investors are higher (b− a high) and when the cost is lower.
That is, if resetting the learning process is more valuable because unsophisticated investors forfeit
significant surplus, then the provider will wish to capture these rents as frequently as possible.
Since c > 0, though, they will not optimally do this continuously, that is, ti+1 − ti > 0 for all i.
When the cost is higher, the provider will wait longer before he incurs this cost, ceteris paribus.
If the cost is sufficiently high, that is, if c > c¯, the provider will never change his fees or mutual
funds. The first term for c¯ in (5) represents the present value of the provider’s profits if he never
refreshes the fund family. The second term in c¯ represents the present value of a stream of constant
payments equal to the instantaneous profit the provider earns once sophistication reaches its upper
limit. Thus, the difference between the two terms in (5) computes the excess rents that the provider
collects when sophistication is subpar in this market absent any obfuscation.
Not surprisingly, c¯ changes in an intuitive way based on the other parameters in the model. As
we show in Proposition 9 in the appendix, c¯ is increasing in (b − a), which implies that it is more
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attractive to engage in obfuscation when the extra rents gained from unsophisticated investors are
high. We also show, under fairly general conditions, that c¯ is decreasing in λ and x0.
8 This means
that, if learning is slower and the fraction of experts is lower, it is more worthwhile for the provider
to engage in obfuscation.
Now, we consider the relationship between t∗ and λ, which is a bit trickier. We first state the
proposition that characterizes this relationship and then describe it intuitively.
Proposition 3. Suppose that c < sup
λ
c¯(λ, x0). If
lim
λ→0
xt = x0 and lim
λ→∞
xt = 1 ∀t > 0, (7)
then
lim
λ→0
t∗(λ) =∞ and lim
λ→∞
t∗(λ) =∞, (8)
and the function t∗(λ) is non-monotone in λ.
Proposition 3 can be appreciated as follows. The conditions about a particular learning process
in (7) are sufficient for t∗(λ) to be non-monotone in λ. The first condition says that as the rate of
learning converges to zero, then the fraction of sophisticated investors remains the same (i.e., the
initial level) for any fixed time. The second condition says that as the rate of learning converges to
infinity, the entire population becomes sophisticated for any arbitrarily small time.
If these two conditions hold for a particular learning process, then t∗(λ) is non-monotone in
λ. Intuitively, if learning occurs very slowly, the provider will make changes to his mutual funds
infrequently. In fact, if λ → 0, then the provider will never make any changes because there is
no benefit to paying the cost c. As learning occurs at a higher rate (higher λ), then the provider
might want to make changes more quickly to keep resetting the process and stay ahead of investor
sophistication. However, as learning becomes sufficiently fast, there is a diminishing benefit to
obfuscation. To see this, consider a limiting case when λ→∞, that is when sophistication evolves
instantaneously. In this case, the rents that are gained compared to the monopoly rent a are
negligible because they are short-lived. Since, c > 0, the optimal strategy for the provider is never
to make changes. Therefore, when λ→ 0 and when λ→∞, we expect t∗ =∞, whereas for values
of λ in between we may observe a finite t∗. Thus, there exists a non-monotonic relationship between
λ and t∗.
8Specifically, if there exists a constant κ such that for all λ and x0, lim
t→∞
xt = κ, then the mentioned comparative
statics hold. This condition is sufficient and implies that if the provider never obfuscates, the sophistication in the
population reaches the same limit, which is independent of x0 and λ. The specific learning processes that we study
in Section 3.2 satisfy this condition.
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Now, we consider the relationship between t∗ and x0.
Proposition 4. Suppose that c < sup
x0
c¯(λ, x0). If
∂2xt
∂x0∂t
< 0, (9)
then ∂t
∗
∂x0
> 0. If
lim
x0→0
xt = 0 ∀t > 0 (10)
then
lim
x0→0
t∗(x0) =∞ and lim
x0→1
t∗(x0) =∞, (11)
and the function t∗(x0) is non-monotone in x0.
Condition (9) means that the rate at which investors become sophisticated is decreasing in the
initial fraction x0 of experts in the population. If the learning process has this property, the provider
obfuscates less frequently when x0 is higher: the rents that are collected from unsophisticated
investors are strictly lower so that the benefit to paying the cost c is decreased. As we will soon
illustrate by example, the condition in (9) usually exists when investors learn independently from
each other, but does not hold generally for group learning processes.
If the condition in (10) holds, however, then the relationship between t∗ and x0 is non-monotonic.
Intuitively, the limit in (10) says that if the fraction of experts tends to zero, that no matter how
much time passes, all investors remain unsophisticated. This condition will hold generally when
investors learn from each other. If no one is sophisticated in the first place, then there is no one
to learn from. In contrast, if investors learn on their own from accessing information from outside
sources, it may be that xt will increase over time, despite the fact that x0 = 0 initially.
To better appreciate how the conditions in Propositions 3 and 4 affect obfuscation, it is instruc-
tive to consider a few examples.
3.2 Learning and Information Percolation
Based on the information percolation model of Duffie and Manso (2007), we analyze two specific
settings: one in which investors learn by themselves and one in which they learn from each other.
Let us first consider a learning process in which investors learn from their own research. This
may occur by reading periodicals, accessing news through the media, or reading a prospectus. More
specifically, we assume that an uninformed non-expert learns what the optimal fund is at a Poisson
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arrival time with a mean arrival rate (intensity) λ, which is common across uninformed investors.
After this time, the investor becomes transiently informed and is able to choose the optimal fund
until there are further changes in the fund family.
Relying formally on the law of large numbers, (1) takes the form
dxt = λ(1− xt)dt. (12)
In this process, a fixed proportion λ of unsophisticated investors become sophisticated at each point
in time. This learning process is a degenerate case of the information percolation model studied
in Duffie and Manso (2007): it can be obtained from equation (9) in that paper when each of the
signals observed by people is either uninformative or fully informative and the intensity of meetings
between people is set to zero. Integrating (12) and using the initial condition x0 yields the solution
xt = 1− (1− x0)e
−λt. (13)
Now, we can consider (13) in terms of the conditions in Propositions 3 and 4. For this process,
∂2xt
∂x0∂t
= −e−λtλ, (14)
which is always negative. From Proposition 4, we have that the optimal time to obfuscate is
increasing in x0. This makes intuitive sense, since in this example the ability to learn is independent
of other investors’ sophistication, so that as x0 rises the rents available to the provider decrease.
Obfuscation is less attractive and occurs with decreased frequency.
To show that the relationship between t∗ and λ is non-monotone, we compute that
lim
λ→0
xt = x0
and
lim
λ→∞
xt = 1.
Consequently, t∗ = ∞ when λ approaches 0 or ∞. Intuitively, this implies that if there are no
sources of information and investors do not learn, then there is no incentive for the provider to
refresh the investor population. In contrast, if access to media or periodicals allows investors to
educate themselves quickly, then the provider will avoid obfuscation because refreshing the investor
population is a futile effort.
Consider the example in Figure 1, in which investors learn without the help of others. The series
of subfigures plot t∗ versus the underlying parameters, while holding all else fixed. As predicted by
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Figure 1: Learning On Your Own: The series of figures (a)-(f) plot t∗ versus the fundamental
parameters in the model, when the learning process involves learning about mutual funds through
the use of periodicals or media. The time t∗ is monotonically decreasing in b and increasing in a,
c, x0, and r. The relationship between t
∗ and λ is U-shaped. Parameters, when held fixed, are
r = 0.03, λ = 1, x0 = 0.5, a = 10, b = 15, and c = 1.
Proposition 2, t∗ is strictly decreasing in b and increasing in a and c. As discussed, t∗ is strictly
increasing in x0 and is non-monotonic (U-shaped) in λ.
Now, let us consider an alternative learning process in which investors learn from each other.
Indeed, as unsophisticated investors meet those who are informed, sophistication within the popu-
lation rises. Such meetings may occur via friends, relatives, co-workers, or advisors. The key factor
in these types of learning processes is that the chance that an unsophisticated investor becomes
sophisticated depends directly on the fraction of investors who are already knowledgeable.
Let us consider a particular example in which investors meet each other in bilateral meetings.
More specifically, we assume that any particular investor is matched to another investor at each of
a sequence of Poisson arrival times with a mean arrival rate (intensity) λ, which is common across
investors. At each meeting time, another investor (i.e., the counterparty in a meeting) is randomly
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selected from the population. An uninformed investor that meets an informed investor becomes
transiently informed about all of the mutual funds offered and can choose the optimal one until
there are further changes in the fund family.
Relying formally on the law of large numbers, (1) takes the form
dxt = λxt(1− xt)dt. (15)
This process differs from (12) in that the rate at which market participants become informed
depends on the proportion of sophisticated investors in the market. This learning process is a also
a degenerate case of the information percolation model studied in Duffie and Manso (2007): it can
be obtained from equation (9) in that paper when each of the signals observed by people is either
uninformative or fully informative and the intensity of arrival of new private information is set to
zero. Integrating (15) and using the initial condition x0 yields the solution
xt =
x0e
λt
(1− x0) + x0eλt
. (16)
Again, we can consider (16) in terms of the conditions in Propositions 3 and 4. With this
process,
∂2xt
∂x0∂t
=
eλtλ(1− x0 + e
λtx0)
(1− (1− eλt)x0)3
, (17)
which can be positive or negative depending on t. Therefore, based on Proposition 4, we are not
guaranteed that that the optimal time to obfuscate is monotonically increasing in x0. In fact,
we can use the condition in (10) to show that the relation between t∗ and x0 is non-monotone.
Specifically,
lim
x0→0
xt = 0. (18)
This follows from the fact that if no one is an expert (x0 = 0), there is no one to learn from. It
then follows from Proposition 4 that the relationship between x0 and t
∗ is non-monotone.
As before, using conditions in (7), we can show that the relation between t∗ and λ is also
non-monotone. For that, it is enough to note that
lim
λ→0
xt = x0 (19)
and
lim
λ→∞
xt = 1. (20)
Consequently, t∗ approaches infinity when λ approaches 0 or ∞.
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Figure 2: Learning From Others: The series of figures (a)-(f) plot t∗ versus the fundamental
parameters in the model, when the learning process involves learning about mutual funds through
bilateral meetings between investors. The time t∗ is monotonically decreasing in b and increasing
in a, c, and r. The relationship between t∗ and λ is U-shaped, as is the relationship between t∗ and
x0. Parameters, when held fixed, are r = 0.03, λ = 1, x0 = 0.5, a = 10, b = 15, and c = 1.
Consider the example in Figure 2, in which investors learn from each other. The series of
subfigures plot t∗ versus the underlying parameters, while holding all else fixed. Again, as predicted
by Propositions 2-4, t∗ is strictly decreasing in b, increasing in a and c, and non-monotonic (U-
shaped) in λ and x0.
Now, we consider how these different learning process may affect welfare in the market and the
efficacy of educational initiatives.
3.3 Welfare and Policy Implications
So far in the model, the only source of welfare loss is the cost that the provider incurs when he
changes his fund family. The fees that investors pay and the extra rents gained from unsophisticated
investors are transfers between the parties to the transaction. A social planner who wishes to
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maximize welfare in this market, therefore, seeks to minimize the quantity
L = C(r, T ),
where we recall that C(r, T ) is the lifetime costs of obfuscation, given the plan T .
The social planner may consider undertaking initiatives to raise the rate of learning λ or alter
the fraction of experts in the market x0. For example, subsidizing websites to enhance investor
education or legislating initiatives to enhance disclosure might increase the ability for people to
learn about the market (i.e. increase λ). Requiring that financial education be an integral part of
secondary education would be likely to increase the fraction of experts in the first place (i.e. raise
x0).
The discussion in Section 3.2, though, implies that optimal intervention through policies needs
to take into account the way in which people learn. Likewise, the magnitude of intervention is
equally important as small scale programs might actually decrease welfare. For example, consider
in the two examples discussed that the relationship between t∗ and λ is non-monotonic. For low λ,
small increases in the speed of learning will decrease the time to obfuscation and will thus decrease
welfare.
The key here is that when a social planner considers an initiative to improve investor sophisti-
cation, they need to consider the natural response on the part of the provider to maximize rents,
given the initiative that is undertaken. In this way, for any λ on the decreasing portion of the
curve in Figure 1e or 2e, a small supplement to λ will lead to more obfuscation by the provider,
which destroys value. Only if the magnitude of intervention is large enough will the market reach
the upward sloping portion in which increased access to information leads to lower obfuscation.
Counter-intuitively, for low values of λ it may be more effective for the social planner to make
learning more difficult, decreasing λ.
The differences in the relationship between t∗ and x0 among the two examples of learning
also highlights that the social planner needs to take into account the mechanism by which people
learn when they set policy. If people learn from periodicals, increasing education is always welfare
enhancing (see Figure 1d) no matter how unsophisticated the population is. This does not hold for
learning processes in which people learn from each other (see Figure 2e). If x0 is low, small positive
increments will induce the provider to obfuscate more frequently and destroy welfare. Only larger
scale initiatives are able to overcome this loss in value.
So far, in the model, the only loss from obfuscation arises from the cost the provider pays to
“refresh” the line of mutual funds. Realistically, though, there are other costs of obfuscation in the
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market that a social planner needs to consider. First, investors might incur costs to learn or keep
up with changes in the market. That is, the learning process in (1) might proceed with a cost to
non-expert investors. Any policy that would increase obfuscation would increase investors’ reliance
on (1), which would cause mounting welfare losses. Likewise, becoming an expert represents an
important opportunity cost to society. The more that providers practice obfuscation, the more
investors will rationally choose to pay an opportunity cost (of time and resources) to make sure
they get a good deal. We characterize this deadweight loss in Section 5 on endogenous expertise.
Obfuscation also has an adverse effect on the willingness of investors to participate in the
market. If the market is too confusing, some investors may choose to just drop out, which may
induce them to misallocate resources. This represents an important deadweight loss and any policy
that increases the incentives for the provider to change his fund family more frequently leads to
further welfare loss. We analyze this source of welfare loss next.
4 Participation and Portfolio Allocation
So far, we have assumed that all investors participate in the market and buy shares in a mutual fund.
Now, we relax that assumption and consider how participation affects obfuscation in the market,
and vice versa. We begin by considering that the fraction of the population that invests in a mutual
fund is given exogenously, to see how this changes the provider’s incentives to obfuscate. Following
that, we consider how participation endogenously arises by analyzing a portfolio allocation problem
in which investors choose how much of their wealth to invest in various sectors in the market.
Obfuscation causes distortions in the allocations of some non-expert investors, and we quantify the
welfare loss this induces.
4.1 Participation and Obfuscation
Consider that the unit mass of investors is split between investors who participate in the market
and those who are either unaware of the funds, or who have decided that these funds are not
appropriate for their needs. Specifically, in addition to expert and non-expert investors (fraction
φ), there is a group 1−φ of investors who do not participate in the market. As such, the parameter
φ may proxy for the scope of the funds: low φ implies specialized funds whereas funds with high φ
have more widespread use (e.g., precious metal funds versus S&P 500 index funds). The provider
receives no demand from investors who do not participate. At any given point in time, then, there
is fraction φxt of sophisticated investors and φyt of unsophisticated investors.
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Taking φ as given, the provider’s instantaneous profit is
π(xt, yt, φ) = φ{axt + byt},
where b > a. As before, the provider may choose to refresh the population of market participants
at any time t. The times in which the provider does this are given by the vector T = (t1, t2, t3, . . .).
The provider, therefore, solves
sup
T=(t1,t2,t3,...)
s.t. ti≤ti+1
∫ ∞
0
e−rtπ(xt, yt, φ)dt −C(r, T ). (21)
As in Section 3, the provider’s problem is stationary and can be reposed as
max
t
∫ t
0 e
−rsφ{axs + b(1− xs)}ds − e
−rtc
1− e−rt
. (22)
The following proposition characterizes the effect that participation has on the solution to the
problem.
Proposition 5. (Obfuscation and Participation) There exists a unique optimal stopping time t∗ > 0
that solves the provider’s problem. For t∗ <∞, ∂t
∗
∂φ
< 0.
According to Proposition 5, when funds are more specialized (low φ), there is lower obfuscation
than when the funds have more widespread use (high φ). The result is a straightforward application
of the analysis in Section 3. As φ rises, the aggregate rents to be gained from unsophisticated
investors rise, which induces the provider to refresh the population more frequently. The result
has important and interesting empirical implications. Comparing two classes of mutual funds
with different specialization (e.g. S&P 500 Index funds versus Precious Metals funds), we would
expect the product mix of funds to change more frequently with the funds with less specialization.
Empirically, one might proxy for φ by considering the fraction of total assets in the marketplace
invested in a particular class of funds, or by considering the number of people who invest in that
class of funds.
From a welfare perspective, it is reasonable to assume that there is a cost associated with
having unaware consumers that do not participate in the market. In this case, a social planner
might like to increase awareness and participation to reduce those costs. However, as Proposition
5 shows, increasing participation leads to more frequent wasteful obfuscation. From the social
planner perspective, there should exist an optimal level of participation that balances the losses
from leaving investors out of the market with the losses from more frequent wasteful obfuscation.
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4.2 Portfolio Allocation
Let us now consider that all investors face a portfolio allocation problem. Since x0-types can
easily keep up with changes in any particular market, they allocate their wealth to assets in the
market optimally. In contrast, y0-types have to take into account ex ante whether to participate in
particular markets, given the rents that they anticipate paying and the obfuscation they will face.
Consider that y0-types derive a heterogeneous surplus from participating in this particular
market, which we denote by si for all i ∈ I. Indeed, si may be a function of each non-expert’s risk
aversion, bequest motive, or longevity risk. We suppose that si is distributed in the y0 population
according to a twice continuously differentiable function M over the support [0, s]. We assume that
s ≥ b
r
, so that at least some non-experts are always willing to allocate some wealth to the market
under study.
When y0-types participate in this market, they anticipate that they will forfeit rents R(t
∗,−→w )
to the provider. These rents are a function of the underlying parameters −→w ≡ (a, b, c, λ, x0) and the
equilibrium level of obfuscation t∗ chosen by the provider. Higher obfuscation increases the rents
that each y0-type can expect to pay, but will in turn affect their willingness to allocate investment
resources to this market.
Each non-expert chooses whether to allocate some of their wealth to this market, given the
surplus si and the rents R
(
t∗(φ,−→w ),−→w
)
they expect to forfeit, given that the provider subsequently
chooses t∗ according to (22). As such, a non-expert investor participates in this market iff
si ≥ R
(
t∗(φ,−→w ),−→w
)
. (23)
Participation in this market is a fixed point implicitly defined by
φ = 1−M
(
R(t∗(φ,−→w ),−→w )
)
≡ z(φ). (24)
The following proposition establishes an equilibrium in this market and characterizes the partici-
pation by non-expert investors.
Proposition 6. A unique solution φ∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists for the expression in (24) for any M(·).
Participation by non-experts have the following properties:
(i) ∂φ
∗
∂b
< 0
(ii) ∂φ
∗
∂a
> 0
(iii) ∂φ
∗
∂c
> 0
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Proving that a fixed point in this problem exists is straightforward. Since the function K(φ) ≡
z(φ) − φ is strictly decreasing in φ, K(0) > 0, and K(1) < 0, there exists one, and only one, φ∗
such that K(φ∗) = 0.
Economically, Proposition 6 implies that higher (b − a) causes fewer non-experts to allocate
wealth to this market via two channels. First, as (b − a) rises, non-experts will pay higher rents
during times that they are unsophisticated. Second, as (b−a) increases, the provider has a greater
incentive to obfuscate, which increases the expected time that a non-expert will spend as an unso-
phisticated investor. Obfuscation magnifies the destruction of value for non-experts and decreases
the attractiveness of allocating their wealth into this market.
When some non-experts misallocate their wealth away from this market, this adds a deadweight
loss to the analysis. Since the rents are merely transfers when they do participate, the loss from
misallocation can be calculated as
NP =
∫ s∗
0
sdM(s), (25)
where s∗ = M−1(1 − φ∗). Since φ∗ is an increasing function of t∗, higher obfuscation causes φ∗
to drop, thus raising s∗. By inspection of (25), it is clear that more frequent obfuscation causes a
higher deadweight loss through misallocation.
5 Endogenous Expertise
Now, we consider that the fraction of expert investors x0 arises endogenously. The timing of the
game is as follows. First, each investor i ∈ I chooses whether to pay a cost ki to become an expert
and join the x0 population. Following this, the rest of the game follows in the same fashion as
in Section 2. The cost ki is a one-time cost, and could be considered to be the decision whether
to obtain a financial education. Alternatively, it could represent the decision whether to become
familiar with a particular mutual fund sector.9 Investors in the x0 pool are experts and know to
keep up with developments as time goes on. Those in the y0 pool may learn about particular funds
over time, but do not have higher levels of sophistication that are required to make sure that they
always get the best deal. Learning takes place as before according to the differential equation in
(1).
Suppose that investors are heterogeneous and the costs to become an expert are distributed
9An alternative specification of the model would be to allow investors to make this choice each time the provider
refreshes their product line. Focusing on Markov Perfect Equilibria, the results would be qualitatively similar to
what we derive here. Of course, in such a model, other Nash Equilibria that are not stationary might arise, but this
is beyond the scope of our analysis.
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over the support [0, k¯] according to a twice continuously differentiable function G(·). Define B as
the expected benefit of becoming an expert given the actions of other investors and the expected
actions of the provider. Therefore, if ki ≤ B, investor i becomes sophisticated. It follows then that
x0 = G(B).
The value of B will depend on x0 and on the t
∗ that is chosen by the provider based on x0 and the
underlying parameters. Going forward, we define−→v ≡ (a, b, c, λ) to be the parameters that are given
exogenously in the model, and keep t∗ and x0 separate since they are determined endogenously. As
such, we express the expected benefit to becoming an expert as B(x0, t
∗,−→v ). The function B is
decreasing in t∗ since the rents that the unsophisticated pay decrease when less obfuscation takes
place. Also, ∂B
∂b
> 0 and ∂B
∂a
< 0. Define B as the lower limit of B, that is, the benefit to becoming
an expert when t∗ = ∞. We assume that B < k¯; otherwise, all investors would become experts
leading to an uninteresting interaction.
In any equilibrium of this game, the fraction of expert investors is implicitly defined by
x0 = G
(
B
(
t∗(x0),
−→v
))
≡ H(x0). (26)
Going forward, we follow the standard approach of Debreu (1970) and Mas-Colell (1985) and focus
on the “regular” equilibria of the game.10 Such equilibria are robust to small perturbations of
the set of parameters, and are therefore locally unique, which allows for meaningful comparative
statics. Technically, in our setting, a regular equilibrium is defined as a fraction x∗0 > 0 such that
h(x∗0) ≡ H(x
∗
0) − x
∗
0 = 0 and
∂h
∂x∗
0
6= 0. By straightforward application of Sard’s Theorem and
Mas-Colell (1985), other pathologic equilibria may be ruled-out as non-generic. Specifically, it is
straightforward to show that, except for a set of parameters having zero measure in the general
parameter space, the equilibria that will arise are regular.11
The following proposition proves existence of a fixed point and characterizes the regular equilib-
ria of the game. In doing so, we distinguish equilibria based on their stability in the sense of Vives
(1990, 1999, 2005). Specifically, an equilibrium is said to be locally stable at a point x∗0 if there
10Originally, Debreu (1970) and Mas-Colell (1985) focused on “regular” equilibria to characterize general equilibria
in exchange economies. Indeed, there are pathologic situations in which the excess demand function z(p) might lead to
an infinite number of equilibria, preventing comparative statics exercises. By limiting the focus to regular equilibria
and proving that such pathologic cases are non-generic, local uniqueness and differentiability of the equilibria is
guaranteed, thereby allowing for comparative statics to be generated.
11See Chapter 8 in Mas-Colell (1985) for a thorough discussion of genericity analysis and Carlin, Dorobantu, and
Viswanathan (2008) for an application of this in finance. A proof of this statement would follow from the same
arguments in the proof of Proposition 2 in Carlin, Dorobantu, and Viswanathan (2009).
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exists a neighborhood around it such that for any initial position x0 within that neighborhood, the
system converges to the point x∗0 according to the function H(x0).
Proposition 7. A solution x∗0 ∈ (0, 1) exists for the expression in (26) for any G(·). If
∂2xt
∂x0∂t
< 0,
there exists a unique x∗0 > 0 with the following properties:
(i)
∂x∗
0
∂b
> 0
(ii)
∂x∗
0
∂a
< 0
(iii)
∂x∗
0
∂c
< 0
If ∂
2xt
∂x0∂t
≥ 0, there may exist multiple regular equilibria. However, in any stable equilibrium, the
same properties hold.
According to Proposition 7, if ∂
2xt
∂x0∂t
< 0, then there exists only one equilibrium for the game.
This will generally be the case when people learn on their own from periodicals, which was the
case when f(λ, xt) took the form in (12). In other cases, where this condition does not hold
(e.g. the process in (15)), we are not guaranteed to have a unique equilibrium. Indeed, two classes
of regular equilibria may form: a stable one with the properties specified in Proposition 7 and an
unstable variant that has the opposite comparative statics. The proof of Proposition 7 details this
distinction.
The comparative statics in Proposition 7 imply that as the rents to the provider b− a increase,
more investors will become experts in the first place. This occurs through two channels. First, as
b−a increases, unsophisticated investors will pay higher rents over time, so they are more willing to
invest in education. Second, and equally important, rising b−a induces the provider to increase the
frequency with which they change their product mix, which drives more investors to gain expertise
in the first place. The same relationship holds with regard to the cost c.
Based on this analysis, there is another cost of obfuscation to society. Specifically, a proportion
of investors will have to allocate resources to gain expertise, which represents an opportunity cost.
This cost may then be computed as
K =
∫ B
0
kdG(k).
As in Section 3.3, this has important policy implications when a social planner considers initiatives
to change learning through λ. As shown there, a change in λ may induce the provider to change his
mix of investment funds more frequently. Looking forward, more investors will expend resources
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to gain expertise, which destroys value. If the magnitude of intervention is large enough, though,
increased access to information will lead to lower obfuscation and higher welfare.
Of course, throughout the paper so far, we have considered the effects of obfuscation when the
provider is a monopolist. Now, we turn our attention to the effects of competition on obfuscation
and welfare.
6 Competition and Obfuscation
Consider now that n homogeneous financial institutions, indexed by j ∈ N = {1, ..., n}, each sell a
continuum of mutual funds. Each fund in the market is denoted by wj,k, where j designates the
provider and k ∈ [0, 1] is their kth fund. There is a unit mass of investors with unit demand who
are willing to forfeit rents of v > 0 to purchase a fund.12
Experts are able to identify the best available funds among all the of products offered in the
market, and they efficiently update their decisions as providers change their fund families over time.
Each expert at any time thus demands the best available fund as long as the forfeited rents are
weakly less than v. If more than one provider offers the best fund, experts will choose randomly
among these options. Non-experts can become sophisticated transiently through learning according
to the process in (1). When they do so, they learn about the best available fund(s) in the market.
Each transiently sophisticated investor gets the best deal in the market, and invests in the same
fashion as experts. However, when non-experts are unsophisticated, they purchase randomly from
one of the providers as long as the expected forfeited rents from doing so is weakly less than v.
As already mentioned, this approach to modeling unsophisticated investors is standard in both the
literature on consumer search theory (e.g. Salop and Stiglitz, 1977, Varian, 1980, and Stahl, 1989)
and household finance (e.g. Carlin 2009).13
The providers, therefore, design fund families and choose refreshing policies to maximize their
profits. The following proposition characterizes an equilibrium for this game.
Proposition 8. (Competition and Obfuscation) There exists a symmetric equilibrium in which at
any time t each provider extracts zero rents from sophisticated investors and rents v from unsophis-
12For example, if the funds in each fund family are homogenous so that the only differentiating feature is the fee
structure, v is each investor’s willingness to pay for the fund.
13For example, in models of “all-or-nothing” search (e.g. Salop and Stiglitz 1977 and Varian 1980), unsophisticated
consumers are explicitly assumed to choose randomly among firms. In sequential search models, unsophisticated
consumers are randomly assigned to their first firm and then choose whether to continue searching for the best
alternative. In equilibrium, unsophisticated consumers stop at the first firm, so that they in essence make purchases
randomly from the firms. See either Stahl (1989) or Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) for a complete review of
consumer search theory.
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ticated investors. Moreover, for any n, there exists a unique optimal stopping time t∗(n) > 0 that
solves each provider’s refreshing problem
max
t
∫ t
0 e
−rsv ys
n
ds− e−rtc
1− e−rt
. (27)
For finite n, ∂t
∗(n)
∂n
> 0, and as n→∞, t∗(n)→∞.
Proposition 8 can be appreciated as follows. Because every provider offers a continuum of
funds, they can perfectly discriminate between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. By
introducing a measure zero set of funds that yields rents a, and a measure one set of funds that
yields expected rents b, a provider can assure that only sophisticated investors will ever be able to
find its best available funds, forfeiting rents a. With such a product line, unsophisticated investors,
who purchase randomly, will forfeit rents b almost surely.14
Competition drives the rents a earned from sophisticated investors to zero. Suppose that in
equilibrium the best available fund in the market yields rents a > 0. One provider could profitably
deviate from the equilibrium and produce an even better fund that yields a rent of a − ǫ per
investor, with a small ǫ > 0, capturing the demand of all sophisticated investors. This might
involve decreasing the fees associated with the fund, improving quality, or adding an attractive
dimension. In classic Bertrand fashion, the ensuing equilibrium involves each provider offering a
superior product with the same value, earning zero rents (a = 0) from sophisticated investors.
On the other hand, at each time t, each provider faces a captive demand yt/n of unsophisticated
investors. To maximize profits without violating the participation constraint of unsophisticated
investors, it is optimal for providers to set b = v.
With regard to refreshing policies, each provider’s optimal choice is thus qualitatively similar to
that when they are a monopolist, except that their problem is a scaled down version of the stationary
problem in Section 2. Each provider solves the problem in (27). As compared to the problem in
(4), providers obtain zero rents from the sophisticated investors. Because unsophisticated investors
purchase their funds randomly from any of the n providers, at any time t each provider receives
an equal share of demand from unsophisticated investors, yt
n
. Moreover, the rents forfeited by an
unsophisticated investor are equal to v, their reservation value for owning the fund.
As in our previous analysis, there exists an optimal time to obfuscate. The solution t∗(n) is
strictly increasing in n, and under perfect competition, obfuscation disappears altogether.
14Alternatively, the providers could each choose a measure one distribution of rents according to a continuous
function F (·) with expected rent of b. Since investors in this model are risk-neutral, such equilibria are payoff-
equivalent to the one described here.
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One concern that may arise is that the results of Proposition 8 depend on the assumption that
obfuscation involves only fixed costs c to each provider, while the rents earned by each provider
are decreasing in the number n of providers. However, the results of Proposition 8 are robust to an
alternative formulation in which the obfuscation cost incurred by providers each time they refresh
their product line is c(µ) = c1 + c2µ, where µ is the market share of the providers. In this case, as
long as c1 > 0, obfuscation is decreasing in n and disappears altogether when all investors become
sophisticated as in the benchmark case studied above.
The decrease in obfuscation associated with competition has straightforward welfare implica-
tions based on the discussion in previous sections of the paper. Clearly, as obfuscation decreases
the incentive to become an expert (an x0-type) decreases, so that investors in aggregate incur lower
costs when they participate in the market. It remains ambiguous, however, the effect that lower
obfuscation has on the aggregate costs that providers incur. On an individual basis, C(r, T ) is
lower when there is more competition, but it is unclear whether nC(r, T ) is lower in aggregate.
The results here, though, must be taken with some degree of caution as the model does not ad-
mit generality to cover all market settings and conditions. It is intuitive that the information rents
that accrue due to obfuscation dissipate when there are more providers. This result is consistent
with Robert and Stahl (1993), who show that informative advertising increases with competition.
However, it is also possible to consider alternative models in which competition may lead to greater
obfuscation. Indeed, Carlin (2009) presents a static model in which complexity rises with compe-
tition. In the same way, if λ or x0 were to decrease with competition because learning is more
arduous (i.e., consistent with Carlin, 2009), then obfuscation might increase. Therefore, while the
results in Proposition 8 are plausible and intuitive, we do not assert that they are general to all
market settings. This is the subject of future research.
7 Concluding Remarks
Many retail investors lack sophistication regarding financial products, but choose to participate in
the market. Over time, many learn but are required to keep abreast of developments in the market
as they occur. Such changes are endogenously induced by producers in the financial market, and
must be taken into account when government-sponsored educational initiatives are implemented.
In this paper, we study the interaction between obfuscation and investor sophistication in a
dynamic setting. We characterize optimal cycles of obfuscation and demonstrate how they change
based on primitives in the market: the extra rents available from unsophisticated investors, the
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baseline financial education that investors possess, the speed at which learning takes place, and the
underlying mechanism in which sophistication evolves. Strikingly, we show that small educational
initiatives may induce further obfuscation by providers, which destroys economic surplus. Such
wasteful obfuscation is enhanced as more investors participate in the market. On the other hand,
major educational initiatives are effective in protecting investors and reducing wasteful obfuscation,
but may entail high implementation costs. Our results suggest that an alternative way to reduce
obfuscation and increase welfare is to increase competition among providers.
The analysis in this paper supports the view that education may not be an effective solution
in retail financial markets. As Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2008) show, retail investors do not
make improved investment choices when they have better information about the market. There is
now growing support for the use of default options to assist retail investors and improve welfare
(e.g. Choi, Madrian, Laibson, and Metrick 2004). While not specifically modeled in our paper,
default options would in essence make more investors experts (by proxy) and may decrease obfus-
cation, especially when used on a grand scale or in markets in which people learn on their own.
Such libertarian paternalism makes sense in our model, as it would slow obfuscation and encourage
participation. Given the welfare impact of such policies, continued exploration appears warranted.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let t∗ solve (4). Then the discounted profits achieved by the provider under the optimal policy are
given by:
V ≡
∫ t∗
0 e
−rs{axs + b(1− xs)}ds − e
−rtc
1− e−rt∗
. (28)
We need to show that there does not exist another policy that achieves a higher discounted profits.
Let T = (t1, t2, . . .) be an arbitrary policy. Then, by the above definition of t
∗,
V ≥
∫ ti+1
ti
e−rs{axs + b(1− xs)}ds − e
−r(ti+1−ti)c+ e−r(ti+1−ti)V, (29)
for i = 0, 1, . . . and t0 = 0. Multiplying both sides of the above inequalities by e
−rti we have
e−rtiV ≥ e−rti
∫ ti+1
ti
e−rs{axs + b(1− xs)}ds − e
−rti+1c+ e−rti+1V (30)
Summing the inequalities from i = 0 to i = I causes telescopic cancellation on the left-hand side,
leaving only
V − e−rtI+1V ≥
I∑
i=0
∫ ti+1
ti
e−rs{axs + b(1− xs)}ds − e
−rti+1c. (31)
Taking the limit as I goes to infinity yields the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2
The derivative of the objective function in (4) with respect to t is:
e−rt{axt + b(1− xt)}+ re
−rtc
1− e−rt
−
re−rt(
∫ t
0 e
−rs{axs + b(1− xs)}ds − e−rtc)
(1− e−rt)2
. (32)
The first order condition is given by:
rc+ (1− e−rt){axt + b(1− xt)} − r
∫ t
0
e−rs{axs + b(1− xs)}ds = 0. (33)
The left-hand side of (33) is positive at t = 0. Moreover, the derivative of the left-hand side of (33)
with respect to t is equal to
−(1− e−rt)(b− a)f(λ, xt) (34)
which is strictly negative since b > a and f(λ, xt) > 0.
In equation (5), c¯ is defined as the cost that solves (33) when t =∞. Let us first assume that
c < c¯. When this is the case, the left-hand side of (33) is negative at t =∞. Therefore, there exists
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a unique t∗ <∞ that solves (33). Moreover, because (34) is negative, the left-hand side of (33) is
positive for t < t∗ and negative for t > t∗. Consequently, t∗ is a global maximum.
If, on the other hand, c ≥ c¯, the left-hand side of (33) is positive at t = ∞. Therefore, there
does not exist a t∗ that solves (33) and the derivative of the objective function with respect to t
is positive for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, the maximum is at infinity, meaning that it is optimal for the
monopolist never to innovate.
Because the expression in (34) is negative and f(λ, xt) is continuous, we can apply the implicit
function theorem to prove comparative statics.15 First, we take the derivative of the left-hand side
of (33) with respect to b:
(1− e−rt)e−rt(1− xt)− re
−rt
(∫ t
0
e−rs(1− xs)ds
)
(35)
which is negative if xt is increasing in t. Therefore, the optimal time t
∗ to obfuscate is decreasing
in b. A similar calculation for a shows that the optimal time t∗ to obfuscate is increasing in a.
Next, we take the derivative of the left-hand side of (33) with respect to c:
(1− e−rt)re−rt + re−2rt (36)
which is always positive. Therefore, the optimal time t∗ to obfuscate is increasing in c. 
Proof of Proposition 3
If the first limit condition in (7) holds, it is easy to see that there is a λ sufficiently small such that
c¯ as defined in 5 is lower than c and therefore t∗(λ) =∞. Using the same argument and the second
limit condition in (7), we have that for λ sufficiently large t∗(λ) =∞. 
Proof of Proposition 4
For the first part of the proposition, we take the derivative of (33) with respect to x0 to obtain:
(1− e−rt)e−rt(a− b)
∂xt(λ, x0)
∂x0
− re−rt
(∫ t
0
e−rs(a− b)
∂xs(λ, x0)
∂x0
ds
)
(37)
which is negative if ∂xt(λ,x0)
∂x0
is increasing in t and positive if ∂xt(λ,x0)
∂x0
is decreasing in t. Therefore,
the optimal time t∗ to obfuscarw is decreasing (increasing) in x0 if
∂xt(λ,x0)
∂x0∂t
is positive (negative).
The second part of the proposition is proved with a similar argument as in the previous proposition.

15See, for example, Rudin (1976, p. 224).
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Proof of Proposition 5
We take the cross-derivative of the objective function with respect to φ and t:
(1− e−rt
∗
)e−rt
∗
(ax(t∗) + b(1− x(t∗)))− re−rt
∗
(∫ t∗
0
e−rs(axs + b(1− xs))ds
)
(38)
which is negative if xt is increasing in t. Therefore, the optimal time to obfuscate is decreasing in
φ. 
Proof of Proposition 6
Define H(φ) = z(φ) − φ. Since ∂t
∗
∂φ
< 0, z(φ) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in φ.
Therefore, H(φ) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in φ. Since H(0) > 0 and H(1) < 0,
H(φ) = 0 at one, and only one, value of φ. Therefore, there is a unique fixed point at a particular
φ ∈ (0, 1).
We now derive the comparative statics with regard to b; the corresponding relationships for a and
c may be derived similarly. Define w = (a, b, c, λ, x0) and w
′ = (a, b′, c, λ, x0) such that b
′ > b.
Consider an equilibrium value φ∗ such that H(φ∗, w) = z(φ∗, w)−φ∗ = 0. Since R(t∗(φ∗, w′), w′) >
R(t∗(φ∗, w), w), then z(φ∗, w′) < z(φ∗, w), which implies that H(φ∗, w′) < 0. Given that H(φ, ·) is
continuous, there exists a φ∗
′
< φ∗ such that H(φ∗
′
, w′) = z(φ∗
′
, w′) − φ∗
′
= 0. The analysis for
b′′ < b is performed in the same fashion. Therefore, ∂φ
∗
∂b
< 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 7
First, we show that if a solution x∗0 exists, it must be that x
∗
0 ∈ (0, 1). Since λ < ∞ and b > a, it
must be that B > 0. There must exist a fraction of investors G(B) such that ki ≤ B, which implies
that x∗0 cannot be zero. Now, suppose that x
∗
0 = 1. Then, t
∗ =∞ and B = B. Since k¯ > B, there
exists an investor i ∈ I such that ki > B. Specifically, a fraction 1−G(B) will not pay the cost ki.
Therefore, it cannot be that x∗0 = 1.
Now, we can prove existence of an equilibrium. We know that H(x0) > 0 when x0 = 0 and that
H(x0) < 1 when x0 = 1. Therefore, the function H(·) must cross the 45-degree line at least once.
Given the continuity of H, there must exist at least one point x∗0 at which (26) holds with equality.
According to Proposition 4, if c < sup
x0
c¯ and ∂
2xt
∂x0∂t
< 0, then we know that ∂t
∗
∂x0
is positive. Since
H(x0) is decreasing in t
∗, this implies that once H(x0) crosses the 45-degree line from above, it
never crosses again. Therefore, when ∂
2xt
∂x0∂t
< 0, the fixed point at x∗0 is unique. Comparative
statics follow in the same fashion as in the proof of Proposition 6.
For convenience, we define the function ω(t∗,−→v ) as
ω(t∗(x0),
−→v ) = H(x0)− x0,
so that in any equilibrium ω(t∗(x∗0),
−→v ) = 0. If ∂
2xt
∂x0∂t
≥ 0, then H(x0) may cross the 45-degree line
multiple times, sometimes from above and sometimes from below. In such case, there will not exist
a unique x∗0, but rather two classes of equilibria (Class 1 and Class 2). For those that cross from
above (Class 1),
(i)
∂x∗0
∂b
> 0
(ii)
∂x∗0
∂a
< 0
(iii)
∂x∗0
∂c
< 0
This follows in the same fashion as in the proof of Proposition 6 and the fact that
∂ω(t∗(x∗
0
),−→v )
∂x0
< 0
at the point of equilibrium. For those that cross from below (Class 2),
(i)
∂x∗0
∂b
< 0
(ii)
∂x∗0
∂a
> 0
(iii)
∂x∗
0
∂c
> 0
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This follows in the same fashion as in the proof of Proposition 6 and the fact that
∂ω(t∗(x∗0),
−→v )
∂x0
> 0
at the point of equilibrium.
Now, we follow the discussion of Vives (2005, pages 440-445) and show that Class 1 equilibria are
stable and Class 2 equilibria are unstable. The function H(x0) = G(B(x0)) is an aggregate best
response function. Note that the aggregate best-response function as defined by Vives (2005) is
r(a˜) = F (g(a˜)), where F is our function G, g is our benefit function B, and a˜ is the fraction of
players who take a particular binary action.
Consider a particular Class 1 equilibrium x∗0 and the neighborhood N1 = [x
∗
0 − ǫ, x
∗
0 + ǫ]. By the
definition of this class of equilibrium,H ′(x0) < 1 at x0 = x
∗
0. First, choose an arbitrary x0 ∈ N1 such
that x0−x
∗
0 = δ > 0. By the definition of a Class 1 equilibrium, it follows that H(x0)−H(x
∗
0) < δ.
Since x∗0 = H(x
∗
0), we know that x
∗
0 + δ > H(x
∗
0 + δ) or x0 > H(x0), which implies that the cost of
becoming an expert exceeds the benefit of doing so for the marginal investor. Converging toward
equilibrium implies that x0 → x
∗
0. In words, since the benefit to becoming an expert is lower than
x0, fewer investors will become experts. The same can be shown for an arbitrary x0 ∈ N1 such
that x0−x
∗
0 = −δ < 0: the system will again converge toward the equilibrium point x
∗
0. These two
observations together assure that Class 1 equilibria are locally stable (Vives 1999).
Now, we show the opposite for a Class 2 equilibrium. Consider a particular Class 2 equilibrium
x∗0 and the neighborhood N2 = [x
∗
0 − ǫ, x
∗
0 + ǫ]. By the definition of this class of equilibrium,
H ′(x0) > 1 at x0 = x
∗
0. First, choose an arbitrary x0 ∈ N2 such that x0 − x
∗
0 = δ > 0. By the
definition of a Class 2 equilibrium, it follows that H(x0)−H(x
∗
0) > δ. Since x
∗
0 = H(x
∗
0), we know
that x∗0 + δ < H(x
∗
0 + δ) or x0 < H(x0), which implies that the cost of becoming an expert is
less than the benefit of doing so for the marginal investor. In words, more investors will have an
incentive to become an expert. Therefore, the system does not converge back to x∗0. The same
can be shown for an arbitrary x0 ∈ N2 such that x0 − x
∗
0 = −δ < 0: the system will again fail to
converge toward the equilibrium point x∗0. Either of these two observations assure us that Class 2
equilibria are not locally stable (Vives 1999). 
Proof of Proposition 8
Suppose that indeed all providers play the strategy outlined in the statement of the proposition.
We will show that there is no profitable deviation available to provider j.
First, the rents a extracted from sophisticated investors must indeed be zero at any point in
time. If provider j attempted to extract rents a > 0, no sophisticated investor would invest in the
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inferior fund from provider j. Instead they would just invest in a fund offered by another provider
that offers a = 0. Therefore, this is not a profitable deviation for provider j.
Moreover, provider j cannot extract rents higher than v from unsophisticated investors at any
point in time. If that is the case, unsophisticated investors would opt for the outside option in
which case each of them only forfeits rents v. Also, attempting to extract rents lower than v
from unsophisticated investors can only reduce the profits for provider j, since the demand from
unsophisticated investors for provider j’s funds at time t is fixed at yt/n as long as the rents
unsophisticated investors forfeit in the market are less than or equal to v.
The problem of setting an optimal obfuscation schedule is symmetric since all n providers earn
zero rents from sophisticated investors and face a captive demand from unsophisticated investors.
As such, the providers all choose an obfuscation schedule given that they receive demand xt
n
from
sophisticated investors and demand yt
n
from unsophisticated investors. The rents to sophisticated
investors are zero (a = 0) and the rents to unsophisticated investors are positive (b = v).
Stationarity of the problem follows in the same fashion as in the proof of Proposition 1. Each
provider therefore solves
max
t
∫ t
0 e
−rsv ys
n
ds− e−rtc
1− e−rt
. (39)
Uniqueness of a solution t∗(n) is established using the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 2.
Finally, we take the cross-derivative of the objective function with respect to n and t:(
−(1− e−rt)e−rt(1− xt) + re
−rt
(∫ t
0
e−rs(1− xs)ds
))
×
(
1
n2
)
(40)
which is positive if xt is increasing in t. Therefore, the optimal time to obfuscate is increasing in
n. Taking the limit as n→∞ yields the result that t∗ →∞. 
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Comparative Statics Results on c¯
We now prove some comparative statics results on c¯.
Proposition 9. If there exists a constant κ such that for all λ and x0, lim
t→∞
xt = κ, then
(i) ∂c¯
∂b
> 0
(ii) ∂c¯
∂a
< 0
(iii) ∂c¯
∂λ
< 0
(iv) ∂c¯
∂x0
< 0
Note: The condition lim
t→∞
xt = κ for all λ and x0 implies that after enough time has passed
without any change in the funds the fraction of the population that becomes sophisticated does not
depend on λ and x0. In the two examples we study in Subsection 3.2, this condition is satisfied,
since all investors in the population eventually become sophisticated if the funds are not changed
(i.e. lim
t→∞
xt = 1).
Proof: If lim
t→∞
xt = κ, then
lim
t→∞
{axt + b(1− xt)}
r
=
aκ+ b(1− κ)
r
,
which is independent of x0 and λ.
For the first comparative statics result, we just take the derivative of c¯ with respect to b to
obtain: ∫ ∞
0
e−rs{(1− xs)}ds −
(1− κ)
r
,
which can be rewritten as ∫ ∞
0
e−rs{(κ− xs)}ds.
Since xt is increasing in t, xt ≤ κ for all t. The above derivative is thus positive, completing the
proof. A similar argument can be used to show the second comparative statics result.
For the third comparative statics result, it is enough to show that∫ ∞
0
e−rs{axs + b(1− xs)}ds (41)
is decreasing in λ. Taking the derivative of (41) with respect to λ we obtain
−
∫ ∞
0
e−rs(b− a)
∂xs(λ, x0)
∂λ
ds.
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Since b > a, to show that the above derivative is negative all we need to show is that X ≡ ∂xt(λ,x0)
∂λ
is positive. From a standard result in ordinary differential equation (see e.g. Hsu (2006, Theorem
2.5.1)), we have that X satisfies the following equation:
dX
dt
= fx(xt, λ)X + fλ(xt, λ)
X0 = 0.
Since X0 = 0 and
dX
dt
is positive at X = 0, X is always positive.
The proof of the fourth comparative statics result is analogous, except that we need to show
that Y ≡ ∂xt(λ,x0)
∂x0
is positive. Again, using a standard result in ordinary differential equations (see
e.g. Hsu (2006, Theorem 2.5.2)), we have that Y satisfies the following equation:
dY
dt
= fx(xt, λ)Y
Y0 = 1.
Since Y0 = 1 and
dY
dt
is zero at Y = 0, Y is always positive.
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